My main research interest is the figure of Socrates in the works of Plato and Xenophon. I am particularly curious about how Socratic literature integrates and reconfigures "non-philosophic" elements of the Greek literary tradition and engages with the social-historical world of classical Greece.
My dissertation contributes to an understanding of the dialogues surrounding Socrates’ trial and execution through an examination of Socrates’ emotional state and the emotions that he arouses in his interlocutors and future readers.
My current projects explore emotions, dreams, and religious experiences as key elements of Socratic thought and ethics.
My dissertation contributes to an understanding of the dialogues surrounding Socrates’ trial and execution through an examination of Socrates’ emotional state and the emotions that he arouses in his interlocutors and future readers.
My current projects explore emotions, dreams, and religious experiences as key elements of Socratic thought and ethics.
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Forthcoming Publications
1. "Socrates, Hestia, and the Hearth of the City." In Carolina Araújo (ed.), Women in the Socratic Tradition. De Gruyter Socrates Series: 329-346. Abstract: This chapter examines the household and domesticity as a basis for political thought in the Socratic tradition. Whereas contemporary practices in classical Athens made politics the realm of men and confined women to the household, a prominent strain of Socratic thought seeks to incorporate the domestic, including women, into public spheres. To demonstrate the importance of the household and domesticity, this chapter begins with the figure of Hestia, the Olympian goddess of the hearth. I argue that, when Hestia is invoked in Plato’s texts, her appearance serves as an image of household functions as a starting point for political thought. Hestia, as a divinity, physical location, and abstraction of the household, represents centrality, primacy, and stability, all qualities that serve philosophic ends in Socratic thought. Examining Hestia as a divinity and symbol of the household brings to the surface aspects of Socrates’ feminine persona that supplement his claim to be a midwife. To elaborate the full significance of this Hestian aspect of Socratic thought, I supplement my study of Plato’s texts with corroborating passages from Xenophon. This collection of evidence underpins a reading of Socratic thought in which nurturing and stability are starting points of philosophic inquiry and which incorporates traditionally feminine roles and attributes into Socrates’ public philosophic mission.
2. "Socrates on the Fear of Death and Overcoming It." In Frank Görne, and Isabelle Künzer (eds.), Angst und Furcht in der antiken Welt. Mohr Siebeck Emotions in Antiquity Series. Abstract: I argue that Socrates is sympathetic to his friends’ fear of death and the toll that his death will take on them as well as his surviving family. Additionally, I argue that Socrates himself manifests anxiety around death that is abnormal in Plato’s depictions of him and indicates that the fear of death is unavoidable. While Socratic Intellectualism holds that elenctic discourse alone should prove sufficient to change one’s beliefs about death and therefore alleviate fear and anxiety, Socrates in the Crito and Phaedo turns to storytelling and mimetic recitation to persuade himself that death is the best outcome to his philosophic life. By enacting discursive strategies aimed at soothing emotions rather than shaping beliefs, Socrates proves not to be entirely committed to emotional cognitivism and allows for emotions to fulfill a function in ethical deliberation. Despite his outward calm, Socrates manifests fear and anxiety as he approaches death and demonstrates non-rational strategies for mastering it. On my reading, Socrates is more strongly attached to his bodily life than he readily admits and demonstrates a deeply human need to soothe his friends and himself before he departs to whatever the afterlife may hold.
3. "Protreptic Emotions in Xenophon's Socratic Education." In Rodrigo Illaraga and Claudia Mársico (eds.), (Title TBA). De Gruyter Xenophon Studies Series. Abstract: This paper examines Socrates’ protreptic stimulation of emotions in Xenophon’s Memorabilia. I begin with Xenophon’s general account of Socrates’ emotional engagement in Mem. 4.1 and then turn to two contrasting case studies: those of Critias (Mem. 1.2) and Euthydemus (Mem. 4.2). In each case Socrates shames his target to stimulate self-reflection and moral improvement. Whereas Critias’ shame manifests as hatred for Socrates, Euthydemus recognizes his own epistemic limitations and displays philosophic courage through perseverance. I hold Euthydemus as an exemplar of successful protreptic and argue that emotional resilience is essential for achieving the goals of Socratic pedagogy.
2. "Socrates on the Fear of Death and Overcoming It." In Frank Görne, and Isabelle Künzer (eds.), Angst und Furcht in der antiken Welt. Mohr Siebeck Emotions in Antiquity Series. Abstract: I argue that Socrates is sympathetic to his friends’ fear of death and the toll that his death will take on them as well as his surviving family. Additionally, I argue that Socrates himself manifests anxiety around death that is abnormal in Plato’s depictions of him and indicates that the fear of death is unavoidable. While Socratic Intellectualism holds that elenctic discourse alone should prove sufficient to change one’s beliefs about death and therefore alleviate fear and anxiety, Socrates in the Crito and Phaedo turns to storytelling and mimetic recitation to persuade himself that death is the best outcome to his philosophic life. By enacting discursive strategies aimed at soothing emotions rather than shaping beliefs, Socrates proves not to be entirely committed to emotional cognitivism and allows for emotions to fulfill a function in ethical deliberation. Despite his outward calm, Socrates manifests fear and anxiety as he approaches death and demonstrates non-rational strategies for mastering it. On my reading, Socrates is more strongly attached to his bodily life than he readily admits and demonstrates a deeply human need to soothe his friends and himself before he departs to whatever the afterlife may hold.
3. "Protreptic Emotions in Xenophon's Socratic Education." In Rodrigo Illaraga and Claudia Mársico (eds.), (Title TBA). De Gruyter Xenophon Studies Series. Abstract: This paper examines Socrates’ protreptic stimulation of emotions in Xenophon’s Memorabilia. I begin with Xenophon’s general account of Socrates’ emotional engagement in Mem. 4.1 and then turn to two contrasting case studies: those of Critias (Mem. 1.2) and Euthydemus (Mem. 4.2). In each case Socrates shames his target to stimulate self-reflection and moral improvement. Whereas Critias’ shame manifests as hatred for Socrates, Euthydemus recognizes his own epistemic limitations and displays philosophic courage through perseverance. I hold Euthydemus as an exemplar of successful protreptic and argue that emotional resilience is essential for achieving the goals of Socratic pedagogy.
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Works-in-progress
1. "Soothing Socrates: The Laws a Charm in Plato's Crito." I argue that, in Plato's Crito, Socrates is genuinely in doubt whether he should attempt to escape from prison before his execution is carried out. Contrary to his own assertion that reason alone guides his deliberation, Socrates takes on the persona of the Laws of Athens to soothe his doubts and edify his confidence. Although the Laws make reasonable arguments, the effect is emotional rather than rational: by the end of the dialogue, Socrates becomes deaf to further arguments, so persuaded is he by the authoritative voice of the Laws.
2. "Socrates' Dreams and Epistemic Insecurity in Plato." I discuss four dreams experienced by Socrates in Plato's dialogues. I argue that, though the dreams occur in different ways and contexts, Socrates' dreams point to epistemic insecurity that cannot be resolved through philosophic discourse alone. Dreams therefore indicate the emotional aspects of knowledge and reveal the need for persuasive modes of discourse that build confidence in beliefs.
3. "Envy and Emulation in Xenophon's Memorabilia." In Rhetoric II.10-11, Aristotle examines the emotion envy. Importantly, Aristotle outlines a positive sort of envy that arises in well-disposed individuals whereby envy can motivate a sort of fond emulation whereby the patient undergoing envy assimilates the behaviors of the person envied in order to secure for himself the good things he covets in another. I propose that we find this very envy-emulation mechanism at work throughout Xenophon’s Memorabilia. Xenophon emphasizes that Socrates’ actions even more than his words inspired admiration and a desire to emulate him in his associates. Reading the Memorabilia in this way brings to the fore that for Xenophon, Socrates’ virtue is performed in the public gaze. For Xenophon, Socrates’ virtues are self-evident, and the experience of observing Socrates is sufficient to inspire a desire to attain Socratic virtues through emulation.
2. "Socrates' Dreams and Epistemic Insecurity in Plato." I discuss four dreams experienced by Socrates in Plato's dialogues. I argue that, though the dreams occur in different ways and contexts, Socrates' dreams point to epistemic insecurity that cannot be resolved through philosophic discourse alone. Dreams therefore indicate the emotional aspects of knowledge and reveal the need for persuasive modes of discourse that build confidence in beliefs.
3. "Envy and Emulation in Xenophon's Memorabilia." In Rhetoric II.10-11, Aristotle examines the emotion envy. Importantly, Aristotle outlines a positive sort of envy that arises in well-disposed individuals whereby envy can motivate a sort of fond emulation whereby the patient undergoing envy assimilates the behaviors of the person envied in order to secure for himself the good things he covets in another. I propose that we find this very envy-emulation mechanism at work throughout Xenophon’s Memorabilia. Xenophon emphasizes that Socrates’ actions even more than his words inspired admiration and a desire to emulate him in his associates. Reading the Memorabilia in this way brings to the fore that for Xenophon, Socrates’ virtue is performed in the public gaze. For Xenophon, Socrates’ virtues are self-evident, and the experience of observing Socrates is sufficient to inspire a desire to attain Socratic virtues through emulation.
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Recent and upcoming presentations
1. "Socrates, Hestia, and the Heart(h) of the City." Latin-American meeting of the International Society for Socratic Studies on Women in the Socratic Tradition. Rio de Janeiro, October 26-27, 2023.
2. "Socratic Emotions and the Platonic Soul." University of Kansas, Classics Department Honors and Awards Ceremony, April 22, 2024.
3. "Socrates on the Fear of Death and Overcoming It." Conference on Anxiety and Fear in the Ancient World, hosted at Schloss Rauischholzhausen by the University of Gießen, June 3-6, 2024.
4. "Protreptic Emotions in Xenophon's Socratic Education." International Xenophon Society. Buenos Aires, Argentina, November 7-9, 2024.
5. "Socrates on a Father's Role in his Son's Education." Socrates: The Trial, Politics, and Religion (A conference organized by Rusty Jones and Nicholas D. Smith). Lesvos, Greece, June 7-14, 2025.
6. "The Emotions of The Socratic Elenchus." Socratica VI, International Society for Socratic Studies. University of Crete, October 19-23, 2025.
2. "Socratic Emotions and the Platonic Soul." University of Kansas, Classics Department Honors and Awards Ceremony, April 22, 2024.
3. "Socrates on the Fear of Death and Overcoming It." Conference on Anxiety and Fear in the Ancient World, hosted at Schloss Rauischholzhausen by the University of Gießen, June 3-6, 2024.
4. "Protreptic Emotions in Xenophon's Socratic Education." International Xenophon Society. Buenos Aires, Argentina, November 7-9, 2024.
5. "Socrates on a Father's Role in his Son's Education." Socrates: The Trial, Politics, and Religion (A conference organized by Rusty Jones and Nicholas D. Smith). Lesvos, Greece, June 7-14, 2025.
6. "The Emotions of The Socratic Elenchus." Socratica VI, International Society for Socratic Studies. University of Crete, October 19-23, 2025.